Political jurisprudence points out that constitutional court judges sometimes act like political actors, and that their decisions are a function of strategic and ideological as much as legal considerations. Consequently, the proper role of the courts, notably in exercising their review of constitutionality, has been one of the most debated issues in modern political and legal theory. Part of the controversy is also how to measure the interpretative fidelity of judges to the constitutional texts, or conversely, the level of their political engagement. This paper argues for the reconsideration of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law in that light. Barak's work was intended to provide, in the first place, judges and other lawyers with a sort of judicial philosophy -a holistic system of legal reasoning, applying both to the interpretation of will, contract, statute and constitution. Nevertheless, these conventions of legal reasoning, modified and readapted, could well be used also as heuristic tools by the academics in measuring the interpretative fidelity of judges to various sources of law.
INTRODUCTION
Courts are political agencies and judges are political actors. They decide cases not only on the basis of objective legal norms, but also their values and ideologies, as well as with an eye on the expectations of other political institutions. This is why judges should take their place with other political decision-makers, and be studied by both legal and political scholars. These are the principal tenets of political jurisprudence -political science oriented research on the attitudes and behavior of judges.
How can the judge's interpretative fidelity to law be evaluated. After all, constitutions and other legal sources are sometimes vague, inconsistent and contain gaps. The proper role of the courts, notably in wielding their power of judicial review, has been the subject of one of the central controversies in the modern political and legal science, confronting the supporters of judicial selfrestraint on one side and judicial activism on the other.
Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law offers lawyers a sort of judicial
philosophy -a holistic system of legal interpretation, equally applicable to the interpretation of will, contract, statute or constitution. Indeed, Barak envisaged his theory to serve legal practitioners, in the first place judges, to better actualize the purpose that the legal sources were designed to achieve. Nevertheless, it can well be used, with certain modifications and adaptations, as a heuristic tool by academics in measuring interpretative fidelity of judges to law. This article argues for the reconsideration of Barak's work in that light -as a potential pattern for measuring judges' interpretative fidelity to constitutional texts, and conversely, the level of their political engagement. Equity among litigants, predictability, democracy and the rule of law are just some of the reasons why not only academics, but citizens and public opinion in general, should have some yardstick for that process. To that end, I look first at political jurisprudence, its sources and premises Then I examine briefly judicial self-restraint -the activism debate in the USA and I question whether it has relevance for the European context Lastly I present Barak's precepts for the purposive interpretation of constitutions, by focusing on the notions of subjective and objective purpose in interpreting constitutions, and how the potential conflicts between these purposes are resolved.
travaux préparatoires clearly pointed to the contrary -that the Constitutiondrafters did not consider the Preamble to have binding force.
If the legitimacy of the judicial review of constitutionality can be vexing in countries in which it is not enshrined in the formal constitution, it can hardly be expected to be understood, let alone justified, in countries without any formal constitutional text. Surprising as it may be, the latter is the case with Israel, where the Knesset has never adopted a constitution. However, over time, it did enact eleven fundamental laws, coined as such because of their purpose to organize and limit public power; and, it specified that they could be amended only by an absolute majority, regardless of the fact that they had been voted by a simple minority. At first, the Supreme Court held that the subsequent Knessets were tied by this condition, despite the principle of lex posterior, expending this doctrine in its 1995 7 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 8 If political power is defined by decision-making which is, legally speaking, discretionary, that is, not bound by law, and which has a collective effect, then it has to be admitted that constitutional courts act sometimes politically. 13 Being at the apex of the legal system, due to their power to strike down or uphold acts of other constitutional bodies, they enjoy a certain liberty in the interpretation both of the constitution and the acts which are the object of their control. Such liberty becomes arbitrariness when it is exercised without any interpretative fidelity to law, and, as witnessed by the aforementioned rulings, it can get to the point of being exercised even without a textual basis.
JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT V. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Taking into account the examples of judicial politics referred to in the previous section, it comes as no surprise that the role of the courts, notably in wielding their power of review of constitutionality, has been the subject of one of the central controversies of modern American and European jurisprudence.
In the USA, the main actors of the debate are the supporters of judicial self- . 21 Again, to compare the US Constitution and the German Basic Law, the former was adopted in 1787 and has been amended 27 times since then, while the latter was adopted in 1949, and has been amended no less than 60 times so far. 22 Only seven European countries do not have constitutional courts (Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Greece and Estonia) and two do not have any kind of judicial review of constitutionality (United Kingdom and Netherlands). ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 2 2016
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However, in all of three possible outcomes -when it refuses its jurisdiction, when it accepts its jurisdiction and validates or invalidates the disputed legislation -we can distinguish situations in which the court, rather than using a more straightforward answer, grounds its decision in very abstract and vague legal terms, the specific articulation of which splits the epistemic community.
Only then -such is the claim of this article -can one speak of judicial activism, or better yet, judicial politics, in the European context. Such activism can be strong or weak, depending on whether the court's reasoning, be it constructivist or preservationist, opposes or supports the parliament's will. In other words, and contrary to conventional understanding, 25 the constitutional court may act as a political agent both when it accepts and refuses its jurisdiction, and in the case of the former, when it upholds and overturns the contested legislation. The dividing line is whether it exercises its function with interpretative fidelity to the pertinent sources of the law or not.
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW
The precise question is how to understand interpretative fidelity to constitutional texts. After all, constitutions are inevitably ambiguous, vague, inconsistent and incomplete. 26 The question of appropriate canons of judicial reasoning is so complex that it would take a whole book just to go through various possibilities of interpretative fidelity that different authors have in mind, 27 interpretation, whose goal is to achieve "the purpose that the legal text is designed to achieve". 
SUBJECTIVE PURPOSE IN INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS
The establishment of the purpose, the core element of the interpretative process, entails two sets of considerations, subjective and objective, each of which is multilayered in itself. The subjective purpose constitutes the values, goals, interests, policies, aims, and function that the specific constitution maker sought to actualize. Generally speaking, "it is its psychobiological intent, not the intent of a reasonable person", which an interpreter learns "through the language of the text as a whole and the circumstances external to it, like the history of its creation".
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"Often, the information from different sources about the subjective purpose points in one clear direction, but sometimes the sources conflict. In those instances", ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 2 2016 94 the author. The more credible the information, the more weight the interpreter should give it".
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The constitution-making context concerns the events that brought about the constitution and provide information about the intent of its founders. It includes:
pre-enactment history (the reasons and factors that led to the constitution's passage, including reports of public committees), the constitutional assembly history (committee and plenum hearings and debates), and the post-enactment history (events taking place after the passage of the constitution that point to the intent at its core).
36
Barak does not deny that things get more complicated in constitutional law, in general, when the author of a text is a multi-member body. Such is the case for a constitution adopted by members of a constitutional assembly. The author of the text is the abstract legal entity (the assembly). 37 Nevertheless, "an interpreter should not seek the motivations that propelled the members of the legislative body to vote in favor of the statute but rather should focus on the general objectives they sought to achieve". 38 Still, Barak admits that "interpreters sometimes reach the point where they realize that it is impossible to identify subjective intent of the authors, and that they should abandon the search. Such is the case in interpreting a referendum". 
OBJECTIVE PURPOSE IN INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS
The objective purposes of a constitution are "the values, goals, interests, policies, aims, and function that the text should actualize in a democracy". 40 It is a legal construction which operates at different levels of abstraction. Accordingly, it does not express an actual, but rather a hypothetical intent. And it is not a psychobiological fact, nor does it reflect a particular historical event. 
AUTHOR'S HYPOTHETICAL INTENT
The first and lowest level of abstraction -"imaginative reconstruction" -focuses on the authors of the text, inquiring into the values, objectives, designs, and function that the members of the constitutional assembly would have wanted to actualize had they been asked to resolve the legal question before the judge. The interpreter draws inspiration for this level of abstraction from the ideas and concepts of the culture and legal tradition to which the given legal system belongs. Legal families are based on a common legal experience: "When expressions like 'void', 'authority', 'legal action', 'intent', 'public order', and similar key jurisprudential concepts appear in a normative text -particularly in a statute or constitution -they reflect a legal culture and legal tradition. These expressions are not empty vessels awaiting content. They reflect fundamental legal conceptions, derived from the legal 'family' (tradition) to which the system belongs and from the legal culture that gives these expressions their system-specific, culture-specific, and family-specific jurisprudential meaning". 
PURPOSE DERIVED FROM THE SYSTEM'S FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLES
The fourth and highest level of abstraction engages in the discovery of the objective purpose which can be derived from the fundamental values of the system. It is not always easy to grasp fundamental principles. They vary from legal system to legal system and from era to era. More importantly, no constitution comes with an instruction booklet listing its basic values and principles. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 2 2016
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'heavier' a fundamental value, the heavier the purposive presumption derived from it".
62
CONCLUSION
Political jurisprudence rightly points out that judges, and especially constitutional court judges, sometimes act like political actors, and that their decisions are a function of strategic and ideological considerations as much as legal ones. As a result, the proper role of the courts, notably in exercising their review of constitutionality, which allows them a particularly high degree of discretion, has been one of the most debated issues in the modern political and legal theory.
One aspect of that debate concerns how to evaluate the extent of interpretative fidelity of judges to constitutional texts, and thus the level of their political engagement. Democracy and the rule of law are just some of the reasons why individuals, academics and public opinion should have a yardstick in that process.
Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law offers some heuristic tools in that respect. It argues that the aim of every interpretation should be to actualize the purpose that the constitution was designed to achieve. With that goal in mind, Barak develops a theory directed at establishing subjective and objective purposes in interpreting constitutions, and the resolution of their potential conflicts.
While it does not underestimate the importance of the intent of the constitution maker (subjective purpose), the theory of purposive interpretation in law favors objective purpose in constitutional interpretation. It takes into account that constitutions are not easily enacted and amended, and that they are necessarily always drafted with an eye to the future -to provide a continuing framework for the exercise of governmental power and protection of human rights.
Thus, the objective purpose of a constitutional text emerges through an interpretative juxtaposition of various levels of abstraction which include: author's hypothetical intent; purpose of a reasonable author; purpose derived from the type and nature of the text; and purpose derived from the system's fundamental 
